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In the neoclassical theory of the firm, it is simply taken as 
given that firms operate efficiently. While often argued that the 
degree of firm efficiency should be treated as endogenous (see in 
particular Leibenstein 11966, 1973, 1975, 1978, 1987] and Williamson 
[1967, 1975, 1985], there is as yet no neoclassical model of the 
determinants of firm efficiency.
In particular, much work remains to be done to clarify the links 
between market structure and firm efficiency. The theory of x- 
inefficiency argues that firm efficiency will be greater, the more 
competitive the markets in which the firm operates. This argument has 
been disputed, although perhaps more on semantic grounds than on the 
substantive point that there is a positive relationship between firm 
efficiency and market competitivity.1
Selten [1986] explores the consequences of firm inefficiency for 
market performance. In his model, however, the degree of firm 
efficiency is exogenous. Willig [1987] models the relationship 
between market structure and firm efficiency by examining the 
influence of changes in the price elasticity of demand on firm 
efficiency in a principal-agent model. But the links between market 
structure and the price elasticity of demand are not made explicit.
1. Stigler [1976] argues that the theory of X-inefficiency is ill- 
founded. In the real world, it is costly to enforce contracts. What 
this means is that an employee's performance should be monitored until 
the payoff to the firm of a marginal increase in efficiency equals the 
marginal cost of an increase in monitoring effort. If there are costs  
of monitoring, Stigler argues, it is illogical to the compare the 
level of efficiency that is attainable in the real world and the level 
of efficiency that would be attainable if monitoring costs weie zero 



























































































I present here a Cournot principal-agent model of the 
determinants of firm efficiency. In this model, there is a random ( 
element to marginal cost, which is observed by the firm's manager.
This random element is not observed by the firm's owner, who 
indirectly controls the manager's efforts by setting a fee schedule 
for the manager that depends on the realized value of marginal cost. 
This fee schedule determines the manager's efforts and therefore the 
firm's marginal cost. The firm's marginal cost is in turn a factor 
that determines the Cournot market equilibrium.
The main result of the model is that the degree of firm 
efficiency is inversely related to the number of firms in the market.
The fee schedule which is optimal from the owner's point of view 
balances the marginal payoff from greater firm efficiency with the 
marginal cost of inducing greater managerial effort. The greater the 
number of firms in the market - the greater the degree of competition 
- the smaller the payoff associated with a marginal increase in firm 
efficiency and the less it is in the interest of the owner of the firm 
to set a fee schedule that will induce the manager to make a great 
effort to reduce marginal cost. The consequence is that the 
equilibrium level of marginal cost is greater, the larger the number 
of firms in the market.
II. Structure of the model
There are n firms. The product is homogeneous, and the inverse 
demand curve,
(I) p - a - bO
(where Q - q  + ... * q and q is the output of firm i) is linear.
1 ^2 n  t



























































































cost for firm i is
C2) c,(e,) -<x * e,e L| ,
where o > 0, e, is a nonnegative random variable and L, is the labor 
of the manager of firm i. Without loss of generality, let 0 < e s s (
£ £, and suppose that e, has a continuous density function f(e,
Suppose also that the manager's services are essential to the 
operation of the firm, and that the manager's income from his next 
best alternative employment is zero.
The manager of the firm observes 6, and L,: the owner of the i,rm 
observes neither. The owner of the firm indirectly controls the 
manager's actions by establishing a cost target cle ,) and a fee 
schedule $16,) that depend on the value 6, of the random variable 
that the manager reports to the owner.
The manager must achieve the cost target if he is to receive any 
fee at all. Thus
(3) c(e ,) -  a ♦ 6,e *■' , 
and the manager’s labor is
(4) L, = log e, -  log [cte4) - al .
If the true value of the random cost element is e, and the 
manager reports a value e,. the manager's utility is
(5) U(6,|6,) = $(£,) -  XL, ,
where X is the manager's marginal disutility of labor. The manager 
selects L, to maximize (5). The owner of the firm, unable to 
observe e, directly, maximizes his expected payoff, the expected 






























































































Analysis of the nature of feasible fee schedule/cost target pairs 
is simplified by use of the revelation principle, i.e., that the 
solution to the owner's problem can be obtained by restricting the 
owner to fee schedules that induce the manager to truthfully report 
the random cost component/
A fee schedule and cost target Cj(6j) are feasible if
(6a) Utejle^ 2 UCejlGi), e < i i s e ,
and
(6b) UCejIej) > 0.
The first condition means it is in the manager's interest to make an 
honest report to the owner. The second condition means the manager's 
utility from working for the firm is at least as great as his 
reservation utility.
From (4) and (5), one obtains 
(7) UCijIej) -  UfeJej) = Mlog e, - log e }) .
Then (6) gives
(8a) Ufejle,) > UfejlEj) + k(log e t -  log e t) ,
which can be rewritten
2. The following explanation is due to Myerson [1979, p. 913].
For any fee schedule <p, let ^(e) be the value of e that the manager
reports if the true value of the random cost component is 6. Then
consider a new fee schedule: if the manager reports 6 t, the owner
computes 'J'(ej), and pays the manager the fee that would have been 
paid under the original policy if ^(Ej) had been reported. This will 
induce the manager to truthfully report e. See also Basgupta,




























































































[8b) 11(6,16,) -  U(e,|e,) a X(log 6, -  log e,) .
Running through the same arguments but reversing the roles of 
6, and e, yields
(9) x(log e, -  log e) a U(e,le,) -  U(e,|e,) .
But (8b) and (9) can both be true only if both hold with equality: 
thus any feasible fee function and cost structure must produce a 
manager's utility that satisfies
CIO) u(e,|6,) - U(e,1g,) - xciog e, -  log e,) .
Since (10) is true for all e, and e,. it is true for e , -  e\ 
Substituting e, -  s' in (12) and rearranging terms gives
(11) U(e,le,) = UCelS) * Xlog f -  .
Since S' a £,, the last term on the right in (11) is positive. A feasible 
fee schedule and cost target will give the manager greater utility, 
the closer is e, to its lowest possible value.
No fee schedule that produced U(S'le') > 0 could be optimal for the 
principal, since the principal could always switch to a less costly
feasible fee schedule that would make U(S'IS') -  0 and still satisfy  
U(e,|e,) a 0 for all e,.
An optimal feasible fee schedule therefore satisfies
[12) U(e,le,) -  Xlog §- .
Thus any feasible fee schedule/cost target pair satisfies (12).
Now suppose a fee schedule satisfies (12). Then U(e,|e,) > 0, which is 



























































































Combining (4) and (5) gives
fl3 ) U (ê ,le ,) -  <f>(êt ) -  M o g  e, » M o g  lc (ê , )  -  a j.
Using (13) and (13) evaluated for e, = ê,, one finds
(15)
(14) UCe^e,) -  U(e,|e,) -  k(log e, -  log e,) 
But (14) and (12) evaluated for e, -  6, yield
U(e,le,) * Mlog e - iog e,] -  Ute^e,) .
This Is the second condition for feasibility. This establishes
Proposition 1: A fee schedule/cost target pair {$(6),C|(ê|)} is feasible
if and only if it satisfies (12).
Equations (12) and (13) yield a relation between a feasible fee 
schedule, cost target pair;
This will be used to express the principal's optimization problem in 
terms of the cost target alone.
IV. Product market equilibrium
The product market is one of n-firm Cournot oligopoly with cost 
differences (although in equilibrium all firms have the same marginal 
cost). The realized value of firm l's  profit is
(16)
(17)
where 5, = (a - cie^l/b  and S is the average of all S,'s, or
equivalently
V, ------ ------ si. a
b(n * 1)
a - n[c(e.) - a] + S  [c(et) -  a ])2 - Mog e 
j - 2  J
( 18 )
♦ M o g  [c(6 ,) -  a ] ,




























































































Imputing Cournot behavior to the principal of firm 1, we suppose 
that he picks a cost target cjCejJ that maximizes his expected payoff, 
taking the cost targets of other firms as given. The principal of 
firm 1 thus seeks to maximize
i n
E(V,) = 1— r s f - - / * 3 - a -  nlc(e,] -  a) * £  lc(e.) -  a ]}2f(en)...f(e,)den...de1
bCn ♦ I) i x en j-2
119)
- Mog f  ♦ X J log [c(e,) -  a)f(6,)de, .
Application of the Euler condition of the calculus of variations 
shows that the first-order necessary condition for maximization of 
(19) is found by differentiating under the integral signs with respect 
to c,(e,) and setting the result equal to zero. The first-order 
condition is
(20) -  —-yCa - a -  n[c(£.) - a] + Y  [£(c,J - aj)
b(n * 1 )2 1 j-2  J
where E denotes an expected value.
For notational simplicity, write
(21) a' -  a - a cj » c, -  a
Then (20) can be rewritten as a quadratic equation in c*:
n
(22) n(c*)2 - [a* * 2  E(cJ)]cf * ^  *R i r  ^  - 0
Equation (22) defines the principal's payoff-maximizing cf as a 
function of n, a‘, and the expected values of the fees offered other 
firms' managers. This is the equation of firm l's  cost target 
reaction surface. But this equation holds for all values of in the
> 0 ,
interval (e,e). Thus for the technology (2), the optimal cost target 




























































































the fee schedule that is optimal for the principal is also constant.
Since the optimal cost target is a constant, c* * E(Cj*). 
Substituting this in (22) yields the equation of a reaction surface 
that defines principal l's  payoff-maximizing fee as a function of n, 
a*, and the fees offered other firms' managers.
Since firms are identical as regards the distribution of the 
random part of cost, managers' utility functions, and principals' 
utility functions, in equilibrium all principals will select the same 
cost target. Imposing symmetry in (22) gives an equation that is 
satisfied by the cost target that is optimal for the principals:
(23) (c*)2 - a*c* * ^  ^  • 0.
The root of (23) that maximizes principals' payoffs is
(24) c*
From (24), one obtains






Proposition 2; In the principal-agent model of Cournot quantity­
setting firms, equilibrium average cost rises with the number of 
firms.
Equilibrium values for a numerical example is shown in Table 1.
In this Cournot principal-agent model, the cost target rises as the 
number of firms rises. The manager's fee and the principal's payoff 
fall as the number of firms rises.
These results are just opposite to that which would be predicted 
by X-inefficiency theory. But in the context of the model, they are 
not hard to understand. The principal sets a fee schedule, cost 




























































































Table 1: Equilibrium Values, Cournot Principal-Agent Model
(b > 1, a • 10, a - 1 , e - 1)
n c* 0 V
0.2574 1.3573 7.1354
3 0.3068 1.1817 3.541 6
4 0.3618 1.0168 1.3680
5 0.41 96 0.8686 1.1766
pair will set the principal's marginal revenue equal to the marginal
increase in the agent's fee, subject to constraints. But marginal
revenue will be less, all else equal, the greater the number ol lirms 
in the market. The greater the number of firms, therefore, the
smaller the incentive of the principal to set a high fee schedule and 
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